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1 Introduction
For quite some time, the theoretical work on capital income taxation focused
on conditions under which a tax system preserves investment neutrality. Neu-
tral tax systems are desirable for e¢ciency reasons. An understanding was
built that there are alternative ways of making the return on marginal invest-
ment tax-free. The idea of taxing corporate cash ow suggested by Brown
(1948) and Smith (1963) was the early one and was developed into a prac-
tical tax reform proposal by the Meade Committee (1978). The notion of
investment neutrality of the dividend tax was subsequently introduced in the
spirit of the so-called new view of equity nance and developed by various
authors (Auerbach (1979), Bergström and Södersten (1977), Bradford (1981)
and King (1977)). As in the case of the cash ow tax, it was shown that the
dividend tax falls on the company value, not on the marginal investment re-
turns. It turned out that such investment neutrality can be cast in a general
condition, known as the Johansson-Samuelson Theorem (see Sinn (1987)).
It states that if all capital income is subject to a uniform marginal tax rate
and if the tax depreciation coincides with true economic depreciation, the
present value of the marginal cash ow is left unchanged.
Echoing the ingenious tax theorem of Boadway and Bruce (1984), the IFS
Capital Taxes Group proposed the Allowance for Corporate Equity (hereafter
ACE) in 1991 for the UK corporate system. According to this proposal, the
corporate tax base should be equal to the rms current earnings net of i) an
arbitrary tax allowance for capital depreciation (not necessarily the cost of
economic depreciation) and ii) the opportunity cost of nance. Moreover, it
should ensure a symmetric treatment of prots and losses. According to the
IFS proposal, the opportunity cost of nance should be equal to the default-
free interest rate, thereby making the government "a sleeping partner in the
risky project, sharing in the return, but also sharing some of the risk" (Dev-
ereux and Freeman, 1991, p.8). Under the ACE system the ordinary return,
approximating the opportunity cost of new equity capital at the margin, is
exempt at the corporate level resulting in tax neutrality.
The trouble with such a neutrality view is that it is focused on one mar-
gin among several. The economic dynamics are derived not only from the
expansion of existing rms; new start-up rms represent another key engine.
The economics of start-up rms is, however, fundamentally di¤erent from the
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economics of established corporations.1 The opportunity cost of investment
and the opportunity cost of the discrete choice of establishing a start-up rm
are based on di¤erent mechanisms and subject of di¤erent taxation. While
the market rate of interest dictates the former the wage income in the labor
market determines the latter. Consequently, taxes which are understood to
be neutral in terms of the marginal investment decisions may be distortionary
in terms of entry decisions. Investment neutrality and start-up neutrality are
analogous issues but they require separate analyses.
The e¤ects that tax policies can have on entrepreneurship have been
subject of a number of studies, both theoretical and empirical. For exhaus-
tive surveys, we refer to Schuetze and Bruce (2004) and Gurley-Calvez and
Bruce (2008). The theoretical literature has considered the e¤ects of busi-
ness risk, risk preferences and loss o¤sets (starting with Cullen and Gordon
2002), and the opportunities for tax evasion (starting with Watson 1985).
For the purposes of our paper, it is of importance to notice that the theory
suggests a number of mechanisms through which taxation tends to interact
with entrepreneurship. As those e¤ects have, however, been found to be
at least partially o¤setting each other, empirical studies have tried to solve
the ambiguities. A number of the early time series studies (cf. Schuetze
and Bruce (2004)) concluded that higher tax rates tend to lead to a higher
rate of self-employment. However, subsequently, even those ndings have
been challenged. On the theoretical frontier, the now or never investment
decision was replaced by a more careful analysis as to when the expansion
investment is valuable enough to be activated. The emerging literature with
taxes in the real option framework included Alvarez and Kanniainen (1997),
Niemann (1999) and Sureth (2002). Tax neutrality of the cash ow tax and
the Johansson-Samuelson tax was derived under risk neutrality and extended
to the case of risk aversion by Niemann and Sureth (2004). Pennings (2000)
showed that in such a framework, a subsidy to investment in combination
with taxation of future prots decreases the trigger value of investment.
1The start-up rms are subject of a much greater risk of failure, their ability to share
their risk with markets is more limited and consequently, their access to debt is therefore
more restricted to point out some key di¤erences. The econometric evidence on the high
failure risk of start-up enterprises is convincing. This evidence includes Bruderl et.al
(1992) on German data, Cressy (1996) on the UK, and Mata and Portugal (1994) on the
Portuguese data. Moreover, Geroski (1995) provides an extensive survey of the stylized
facts on entry emphasizing that while entry is common, entry rates are far higher than
market penetration rates.
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Though the neutrality properties of cash ow tax, ACE and comprehen-
sive income tax are well-known in the real option framework, these results
have been derived in terms of the investment programs of existing rms.
Typically, the opportunity cost of a start-up entrepreneur in terms of lost
wage earnings from an alternative career has not been incorporated.2 What
our paper does is to focus on the tax e¤ects on such a career choice. While
the earlier papers have studied the e¤ects of particular taxes, our papers
focus on those taxes on capital income which have been found to be neutral
in regard to the capacity investments of corporations. We ask whether those
neutral taxes are neutral also in another margin i.e. at the start-up stage.
We show that they mostly fail.3
The idea of tax neutrality is rst stated in a simplied micky mouse
model of occupational choice. Is is used if only to make the point that for
the tax neutrality the taxation of labor income is relevant in the early stage
of the entrepreneurs life cycle. Needless to mention, the tax rate on labor
income is missing from the whole theoretical literature on neutrality of taxing
capital income. Subsequently, the issue is thoroughly examined in this paper
in an extended model where entry is viewed as a real option of a nascent
entrepreneur with potential of re-entering into the labor market.4 It is then
shown that the taxation of labor income is relevant not only at the early
stage but also in later stages of the incumbent entrepreneur if and when he
has an option to re-enter the labor market.5
To sum up, our results suggest that any of the above discussed tax for-
mats - though neutral around the steady state of a mature company - are
2It was analyzed empirically by Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2008).
3There is a further margin which is relevant. Niemann (2008) raised the question of
another dimension of e¤ects of (di¤erential) taxation, the e¤ort choice and risk-taking
examining how di¤erential taxation adds to the tax e¤ects of symmetric taxation.
4Thus, our paper is also related to those with partial exibility.
5The empirical paper by Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2008) is the rst one to examine the
e¤ects of tax rates on exit decisions using duration analysis techniques. The authors found
that cutting marginal tax rates faced by wage and salary workers can reduce the duration
of entrepreneurial activities, while cutting marginal tax rates faced by entrepreneurs can
lengthen entrepreneurial spells. Their results thus support the view that tax policies are
not neutral when entrepreneurship is concerned. Moreover, Agliardi and Agliardi (2008)
introduced the real option model to study the tax e¤ects on the closure, the exit policy
of a rm. Their main conclusion is that only the adoption of a progressive tax schedule
can slow down or speed up a closure policy of a rm while any at plan does not interfere
with liquidation. Our paper di¤ers from this conclusion as we show how the exit policy is
a¤ected by a at tax rate on entrepreneurial and labor income.
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distortionary in an early margin in the life-cycle of a rm, i.e., at the stage of a
start-up rm.6 The major result of this paper thus is a negative one: the well-
known neutral systems of taxing income from existing corporations typically
distort the economic decisions both at the start-up and at the liquidation
stage. We show that neither of those celebrated tax systems can possibly
satisfy the requirement of start-up neutrality unless the expected overall tax
burden on entrepreneurial lifetime income is equal to the expected overall tax
burden on labor income. This is a special case that is unlikely to hold in any
real tax system. Though this view can easily be justied, we think that it
needs to be taken up to be delivered into the literature. We prove that, under
a comprehensive income tax, the entrepreneurial choice is delayed unless the
double taxation of capital income is eliminated and a proper depreciation
allowance is ensured. Indeed, business taxes tend to raise the trigger value
of entry. We also demonstrate that uniform taxation is necessary even under
the cash-ow and the ACE taxation for neutrality to hold. However, we will
also show that these tax conditions are hard or even impossible to implement
because of informational problems. When the entrepreneur has an option to
quit his business activity and re-enter the labor market, the tax system faces
a new challenge in that it must cope with the interaction among multiple
options. Our contribution is thus to consider these two neutrality require-
ment simultaneously within the same framework and show that they may
be incompatible. From this perspective, we point out that even the Mirrlees
Review overlooks this problem as it does not consider the tax e¤ects in the
pre-entry stage  though it considers small rms in the post entry stage. We
thus extend the earlier real option analyses with no occupational choice into
a model with an occupational choice.7
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an insight
into our argument using a simple model with no uncertainty. Section 3
introduces an intertemporal model which describes the e¤ects of taxation
on the entrepreneurial choice by a representative agent when uncertainty
shapes the value of the entrepreneurial career. Section 4 extends the model
by assuming that the representative entrepreneur has an option to quit the
6The burden of dividend tax on initial equity injection and the growth path of a rm
was examined by Sinn (1991). He did not, however, address the occupational choice issue.
7Niemann and Sureth (2009) examined the capital gains tax in the real option model
showing that it tends to be harmful for immediate investments. Moreover, Schneider and
Sureth (2010) found that the option to abandon an investment project can have paradoxical
tax e¤ects.
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business sector and re-enter the labor market. Section 5 warns against simple
policy implications from models of mature rms.
2 The basic intuition
The prevailing view of entrepreneurship builds on the occupational choice of
heterogenous individuals, indexed below by i. People are considered taking
rational economic decisions on their career choices. There are a number of
di¤erences characterizing these careers. Whatever these di¤erences are, we
denote the pre-tax value of the entrepreneurial career by V (with potential
options to optimize entry and exit) and the pre-tax life-time income of a
worker by O.8
If only to illustrate, consider rst the simple case where individuals make
career choices at the start of their life-cycle and in the absence of risks. Then,
the option to delay has no value and the career choice is a permanent once-
for-all decision. We assume that people are homogenous as workers but di¤er
in terms of their entrepreneurial abilities, say ai²[a; a]: Then, by denition
@V (ai)=@ai > 0. High-ability entrepreneurs generate more prots. Denote
the total life-time tax liabilities from operating a rm as an entrepreneur, or
alternatively, being a worker are by T and Tw. Those tax liabilities crucially
depend on the real options of the individuals as we will see in the next
sections. The career choice of the marginal individual with ability am can be
characterized by a simple indi¤erence condition
V (am)¡ T = O ¡ Tw: (1)
The marginal entrepreneur is thus identied through equation (1), am =
am(T; Tw). Individuals with ai ¸ am choose entrepreneurship, individuals
with ai < am become workers. Given (1), the enterprise formation depends on
total tax liabilities, rather than on marginal tax rates at various income levels.
In particular, given the life-time tax liability of a worker, Tw; an increase in
the tax liability on the entrepreneurial career reduces the equilibrium start-
up entrepreneurship in the economy, while an increase in the tax liability of
workers has the opposite e¤ect,
@am=@T > 0; @am=@Tw < 0: (2)
8We interpret the value of the entrepreneurial career as including any business options
arising during the career.
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Intuitively, a higher tax burden on the entrepreneurial career calls for
greater entrepreneurial quality at the margin. The non-neutrality result
shown in (2) holds for any tax on an entrepreneurial income, regardless of the
potential neutrality in regard to the marginal capital on the growth path or
around the steady state. Tax start-up neutrality holds only if the tax rates
satisfy a particularly harsh requirement in terms of tax liabilities, T = Tw:
Therefore, even a comprehensive income tax is distortionary if the double
taxation of capital income makes the total tax rate exceed the tax on wage
income.9
In the absence of any start-up sunk cost, the above analysis can be easily
extended to the case of uncertainty of the entrepreneurial income. With risk
neutrality, the marginal entrepreneur is determined by his expected income
relative to the wage income; with risk aversion a risk premium is introduced.
When sunk costs are involved, the career choice becomes more involved and
will be analyzed in the subsequent sections. Here we hasten, however, to
point out that under a comprehensive income tax without double taxation
at a personal level, tax neutrality is carried over to the case of occupational
choice only on condition that the option values of the entrepreneur have been
properly considered. As we will show, they must also include the option to
quit the business activity.
Many entrepreneurial choices are dichotomous. In line with Devereux and
Gri¢th (1999), therefore, whenever an agent faces a discrete choice between
two or more mutually exclusive projects, it is the average rather than mar-
ginal e¤ective tax rate which matters. Therefore, when the proponents of the
"new view" of the dividend tax, the cash ow tax, the Johansson-Samuelson
tax, or the ACE-tax claim to the neutrality of these taxes, they have in mind
a di¤erent margin. They refer to a situation where an established rm with
some pre-invested capital is undertaking a marginal investment. Even the
Johansson-Samuelson tax discriminates against the enterprise formation if
the overall e¤ective tax rate (arising typically in the case of double taxation)
exceeds the total tax rate on labor income. We have been unable to locate
this view in the literature.10 This apparently innocuous result has crucial
9We notice that in a more complicated model it is not necessarily the case that an
increase in the tax on entrepreneurship leads to fewer entrepreneurs. For example, it
is well-known that entrepreneurs can manipulate their income more easily than workers.
With a higher tax rate, the entrepreneurs incentive might increase, thereby resulting in
increased market entry.
10Neither did the Meade Committee (1978) discuss this case. The idea of neutrality of
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policy implications, in that it implies that many celebrated tax systems fail
to be start-up neutral in terms of entrepreneurship, unless harsher conditions
are met.
3 Workers option
In this section, we introduce a partial equilibrium model to study the e¤ects
of taxation on an individuals career choice. We consider an agent who rst
enters the labor market earning the market wage w per unit of time. However,
he has a business idea that develops according to a stochastic process (to be
introduced below). Once he is su¢ciently convinced that the value of his
business idea exceeds some threshold level, he quits the labor market and
establishes a start-up rm. We rst consider the case where the commitment
to an entrepreneurial career is irreversible and thus permanent. In order
to deal with these characteristics, we therefore introduce a continuous-time
real option model.11 In the next section, we will analyze the case where the
individual subsequently has an option to quit entrepreneurship and re-enter
the labor market.
Let us rst abstract from taxes and introduce the following:
Assumption 1 at time t = 0 the individual is an innitely-lived worker,
earning an exogenous wage w, and is endowed with an option to start an
entrepreneurial activity;12
Assumption 2 to undertake a risky activity, the individual pays a sunk
start-up cost I;
dividend tax has been challenged recently by Henreksson and Sanandaji (2004) and its
non-neutrality has been stated by Kanniainen, Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2005, 2007),
but otherwise it has been overlooked.
11In the next section, we extend the model to copy with both the entry decision and the
exit decision from the business sector. In principle, we could use a discrete time model
with three periods, i.e., 0, 1, 2, to deal with both entry and exit. However, in this case, the
agent would be obliged to make decisions at discrete times 0, 1 or 2. Since we want the
agent to be free make choices at any instant, we prefer to use a continuous time model.
12As shown by Panteghini (2007a), assuming an innitely-lived business project does
not a¤ect the quality of results.
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Assumption 3 after entry, the rms payo¤ at time t, dened as ¦t, is
stochastic and evolves according to the following process:
d¦t
¦t
= ®dt + ¾dzt with ¦0 > 0; (3)
where ® is the growth rate, ¾ is the instantaneous standard deviation of d¦t
¦t
and dzt is an increment to a Wiener process.
Assumption 4 the agent is risk-neutral.13
For simplicity, assumption 1 states that the pre-tax wage rate is exoge-
nously given. As we let the individual decide not only whether but also
when to become an entrepreneur, this means that he is endowed with a call
option.14 When the individual decides to become an entrepreneur, thus exer-
cising the option, he loses his wage and, according to assumption 2, must pay
I,15 which accounts for consultancy and administrative costs representing the
strike price of the individuals option. It is worth noting that, whereas entry
fees are observable,16 a relevant part of entry costs may be unobservable. As
pointed out by Djankov et al. (2002), bureaucracy delays may be dramatic
and therefore their cost may be high.17 Moreover, they may greatly vary
from one individual to another, thereby causing heterogeneity.
According to assumption 3, the rms payo¤ follows a stochastic process,
described in (3) by a geometric Brownian motion. The drift parameter ®mea-
13The risk-neutrality assumption does not a¤ect the quality of our results. Indeed, an
optimal timing problem under risk aversion is equivalent to a risk-neutrality one, if we
apply a risk-adjusted drift (accounting for a risk premium). In other words, the stochastic
process (3) can be substituted with an equivalent risk-neutral one, equal to d¦t
¦t
= b®dt +
¾dzt, where b® = ® ¡ ¸¾, with ¸ representing the market price of risk (see e.g. Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), McDonald and Siegel (1985, 1986) and Trigeorgis (1996, Ch.3)). Since we
deal with a partial-equilibrium setting, ¸ is given. As pointed out by Niemann and Sureth
(2004, 2005), an agents risk premium may be a¤ected by taxation. If we accounted for
this tax e¤ect, we would further complicate the conditions for tax neutrality to hold.
14Since this option can be exercised at any future instant, it is an American call option.
For further details, see McDonald and Siegel (1985, 1986).
15For simplicity, we have assumed that the sunk cost I is self-nanced. The results do
not change qualitatively under debt-nance on condition that the risk of default is nil (see
Panteghini (2006, 2007a)).
16For a cross-country comparison of entry fees and procedures see World Banks (2011)
Doing Business 2012.
17Djankov et al. (2002) also show that bureaucracy delays vary among countries.
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sures a workers entrepreneurial ability:18 namely, the higher the parameter
®, the higher is the probability that our agent undertakes an entrepreneurial
career successfully.
Using these assumptions, we can calculate the pre-entry value function
of the worker, dened as O(¦t), and the (post-entry) rm value, denoted
by V (¦t). In particular, the pre-entry value function is equal to the current
wage (namely, the wage received in the short interval dt) plus the remaining
value, that is the value function after the instant dt has passed. Dening r as
the relevant risk-free interest rate, and applying dynamic programming (see
Panteghini (2007a)) we obtain:
O(¦t) = wdt+ e¡rdt» [O(¦t + d¦t)] (4)
where » [:] is the expectation operator. Following the same procedure we can
write the entrepreneurial post-entry gross value function as
V (¦t) = ¦tdt+ e¡rdt» [V (¦t + d¦t)] :19 (5)
Using (4) and (5) we can rewrite the workers value function as follows (see
Appendix A):
O(¦t;¦¤) =
w
r
+max
¦¤
"µ
¦
¦¤
¶¯1 h
V (¦¤)¡ I ¡ w
r
i#
; (6)
where ¯1 > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation, see Appendix
A.
As can be seen, the workers value function consists of two terms: the
rst one is the present value of a perpetual rent yielding w. This term
measures the workers value function when he works forever (and cannot
enter the business sector). The second term measures the workers start-
up option value at the optimal trigger point ¦¤. Therefore, by solving the
problem max¦¤
h¡
¦
¦¤
¢¯1 £V (¦¤)¡ I ¡ wr ¤i, a worker can calculate the value
of his start-up option and nd when it is optimal to become an entrepreneur.
18In line with Section 2, we could generalize our analysis by considering a set of potential
entrepreneurs, each with his own ®, i.e., determined by his own entrepreneurial skill.
However, the quality of results would not change.
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3.1 Comprehensive income taxation and the Johansson-
Samuelson Theorem
According to the well-known Schanz-Haig-Simons (hereafter SHS) denition
of income, the tax base must be comprehensive. In other words, it must
include all income from production factors, such as labor, capital and non-
reproducible factors (e.g., land, raw materials), net of expenses incurred in
earning the income. The idea underlying the SHS scheme is that the income
tax base must be as close as possible to the true net income. This means
that any change in the rms net worth must be taken into account, even
in the value of the workers option! Advocates of this tax argue not only
that such a tax is desirable in terms of fairness, but also that it is neutral in
terms of marginal investment decisions. Indeed, according to the well-known
Johansson-Samuelson Theorem (JST),20 if all kinds of capital are subject to
the same marginal tax rate and scal depreciation allowances coincide with
economic depreciation, the investment strategies are una¤ected by taxation.
To analyze the e¤ects of a SHS comprehensive income tax on entrepre-
neurship, let us denote by OJS(¦) and V JS(¦) the before- and after-entry
value functions, respectively. Moreover, in the spirit of Samuelson (1964) and
the JST, the pre-entry and post-entry depreciation allowance should reect
the change in the option value:
±Odt = ¡»
£
dOJS (¦)
¤
; (7)
and
±V dt = ¡»
£
dV JS (¦)
¤
; (8)
respectively. We note that even with no physical depreciation, an individuals
value function can change over time because of the stochastic development
of the value of the business idea (3). In particular, the value of a workers
option to enter the business sector appreciates if the cash ow increases and
depreciates if it decreases. Finally, remember that under a comprehensive
income tax, all kinds of capital income (including the interest income) must
be subject to taxation. Therefore, the relevant discount rate is (1¡ ¿ ) r.
Dening ¿w and ¿ as the wage and business tax rates, respectively, we prove:
20The JST is the joint result of Johanssons (1961, 1969) and Samuelsons (1964) nd-
ings. For a discussion of the JST see e.g. Sinn (1987, Ch. 5). For an analysis in a stochastic
context, see also Menoncin and Panteghini (2012). Earlier, Niemann and Sureth (2004)
deduced neutral depreciations in the Samuelson spirit in a real option model.
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Proposition 1 Two conditions are needed for the entrepreneurial choice to
be una¤ected by taxation, rst ¿w = ¿ , and second, a depreciation allowance
has to coincide with the economic depreciation of the workers option to be-
come an entrepreneur.
Proof. See Appendix B.
According to Proposition 1, uniform taxation is not su¢cient to ensure
entrepreneurial neutrality. In line with Niemann (1999), we have shown
that neutrality holds in a real-option setting only if all sources of income,
including changes in a taxpayers portfolio of real options, are subject to
taxation. This implies that a neutral income tax system also requires the
deduction of economic depreciation related to the workers entrepreneurial
option. Otherwise, a distortion arises (see Alvarez and Kanniainen (1997)).
Proposition 1 has two important implications. First, it states that a
uniform tax is necessary (but not su¢cient) to ensure neutrality at the entry
stage. This means that no double tax can be levied; otherwise, taxation
discourages entrepreneurship. This result contradicts the new view of equity
nance according to which the dividend tax is neutral. The intuition behind
our result is here: many well-known tax proposals (e.g., based on the new
view) hold only for mature rms. We think, however, that most rms do
not operate in steady state but rather on their expansion or contraction
paths, not to mention rms which are not yet created. For start-ups and
future rms, the neutrality of the dividend tax breaks down for the reasons
discussed in the context of the comprehensive income tax and the JST.
A second implication regards information requirements. According to
Proposition 1, a comprehensive income tax is neutral if a depreciation, i.e.,
±Odt = ¡»
£
dOJS (¦)
¤
, is allowed under labor taxation! However, the en-
trepreneurial ability, and thus the option value varies from one worker to
another. This means that, due to the heterogeneity of workers, a serious in-
formational problem arises. In the absence of market prices, it is hard (even
impossible) to evaluate a workers option,21 and therefore, to measure his de-
preciation allowance. The problem arises from the existence of information
21Notice that these options are non-tradable. The absence of trading has already been
dealt with by Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) in a di¤erent context. By focusing on stock
option plans, they showed that a companys cost of granting employee stock options di¤ers
from the value of the same stock options to employees, under a certainty-equivalence
approach. Di¤erently from the stock-option-plan topic, where two agents (the employee
and the employer) are involved, here we focus on a self-employed agent. Therefore, in our
model, there is no wedge in the evaluation of options, and above all, the start-up option
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asymmetry where workers are the agents and the government is the principal.
In such a context, an individual would be clearly induced to overstate the
value of his entry option in order to reduce his before-entry tax burden.22
3.2 Cash-ow and ACE taxation
Let us next study two alternative consumption-based tax systems: a standard
cash-ow tax and an ACE-type one. In both cases, interest income (i.e.,
ordinary capital income) is tax exempt, and therefore, the relevant discount
rate is r.
Cash-ow tax Under the cash-ow tax, the di¤erence between receipts
and outlays is taxed at the tax rate ¿ at any instant t: In this case, the
after-tax cash ow will be equal to:
¦CF = (1¡ ¿ )¦: (9)
Note that under the cash-ow tax, the investment cost I must be fully
deducted when it is undertaken. The after-tax cost is therefore equal to
(1¡ ¿ ) I .
ACE tax Under the ACE tax, the entrepreneurs payo¤, ¦, is taxed at
the rate ¿ , and, at any time period, a portion ½ of the investment cost I is
deductible from the current tax base where ½ measures the cost of nancing.23
Thus, the tax payment is equal to T (¦) = ¿ (¦¡ ½I) and a rms after-tax
cash ow will be:
¦ACE = ¦CF + ¿½I: (10)
cannot be reckoned in any balance sheet. This leads to another relevant informational
problem.
22Notice that workers might also own options which are never exercised. Even on an
ex-post basis, therefore, it would be impossible to evaluate them. Of course, this leaves
the authorities with a hard task.
23Boadway and Bruce (1984) assume that a representative rm is nanced with both
debt and equity. According to their tax system, the rm can deduct the total cost of
capital, i.e., the market rate of interest, r, times the rms capital, K, so that it can
deduct rK from the tax base. Here, we have assumed for simplicity that the rm is fully
self-nanced. Thus, ½ should be interpreted as the opportunity cost of equity. However,
the quality of results would not change if we assumed an optimally-debt nanced rm (see
Panteghini, 2007b).
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Using dynamic programming, we can write an agents before-entry value
function as:
Oj(¦) = (1¡ ¿w)wdt+ e¡rdt»
£
Oj(¦ + d¦)
¤
with j = CF;ACE: (11)
Solving (11) we obtain (see Appendix C):
Oj(¦) =
(1¡ ¿w)w
r
+Aj1¦
¯1 ; with j = CF;ACE: (12)
As shown in (12), the workers value function consists of two terms: the
present value of after-tax wages, (1¡¿w)wr ; and A
j
1¦
¯1, which measures the
value of his (call) option of entering the business sector. In particular, Aj1 is
an unknown parameter to be determined and ¯1 > 1:
24
Following the same procedure, we can write the after-entry value function
as:
V j(¦) = ¦jdt+ e¡rdt»
£
V j(¦ + d¦)
¤
with j = CF;ACE: (13)
As shown in Appendix D, (13) can be solved as
V j(¦) =
(
(1¡¿)¦
r¡® under CF;
(1¡¿)¦
r¡® +
½
r¿I under ACE:
(14)
Note that the relevant discount rate is given by the di¤erence between the
risk-free interest rate r and the drift ®. By using the adjusted discount rate
(r ¡ ®) ; we thus account for the expected increase in ¦. As shown in (14),
the individuals value function is a perpetual rent. This is due to the fact
that, after entering the business sector, the individual is assumed not to make
any further decisions.
Functions (12) and (14) allow us to deal with an individuals intertem-
poral decision. The individuals problem is one of choosing the optimal en-
trepreneurial timing, which can be associated with a trigger point ¦¤;j. This
means that, whenever the current income reaches ¦¤;j, the individual starts
his business activity. As shown in Appendix E, we can solve for the trigger
points under the cash-ow and the ACE taxes as
¦¤;CF =
¯1
¯1 ¡ 1
(r ¡ ®)
µ
1¡ ¿w
1¡ ¿
w
r
+ I
¶
; (15)
24Notice that, under taxation, ¯1di¤ers from that in the previous section. For simplicity,
however, we use the same notation.
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¦¤;ACE =
¯1
¯1 ¡ 1
(r ¡ ®)
µ
1¡ ¿w
1¡ ¿
w
r
+
1¡ ½r¿
1¡ ¿ I
¶
; (16)
respectively. Using (12) and (14) we also nd
Aj1 =
1
¯1
(1¡ ¿ )
r ¡ ®
¡
¦¤;j
¢1¡¯1 > 0; with j = CF;ACE. (17)
As can be seen in (15) and (16), the entrepreneurs trigger points ¦¤;j are
in general a¤ected by the tax rates ¿w and ¿ . However, we nd:
Proposition 2 The timing decision of the entrepreneurial career is unaf-
fected by taxation if:
1. under cash-ow taxation, ¿w = ¿ ;
2. under ACE-type taxation, ½ = r; and ¿w = ¿ :
As shown by Proposition 2, uniform taxation is a necessary and su¢cient
neutrality condition under the cash-ow taxation. Even in this case, a rms
income cannot be taxed twice (i.e., both at the corporate level and at the per-
sonal level); otherwise, neutrality fails to hold. This result has an interesting
policy implication: i.e., given uniform taxation, neutrality is ensured by a
Hall-Rabushka at tax (Hall and Rabushka (1995)) that entails the taxation
of the cash ow only at the rm level. On the contrary, a distortion arises
under the US Panels GIT proposal since this tax design entails a double
taxation of capital income.25
Let us focus on the ACE proposal. In line with Devereux and Freeman
(1991) and Bond and Devereux (1995), Proposition 2 states that neutrality
can be achieved if ½ = r, i.e., if the tax treatment of the sunk cost I is
equivalent to that ensured by the cash-ow tax.26 However, Proposition 2
also requires that condition ¿w = ¿ is met. This means that an ACE-type
25Similarly, a distortion would also arise under Bradfords (1986) X tax. Under the
Bradford proposal, indeed, labor income would be subject to a graduated-rate tax, and
therefore, tax rates might di¤er from one taxpayer to another. This would violate the
uniform-tax-rate condition.
26Brown (1948, p. 537) argues that distortions "can be substantially eliminated by a
system which permits the rm to deduct either (1) current outlays (or an average of outlays
for a short period) on depreciable assets or (2) normal depreciation on total assets". See
Niemann (1999) and Panteghini (2001a, 2001b) for details on investment neutrality in a
real-option framework.
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tax is distortive in terms of start-up decisions if business income is subject to
double taxation. In particular, the lower the tax rate ¿w and/or the higher
the tax rate ¿ ; the greater the trigger point ¦¤;ACE is. It is worth noting that
double taxation was not excluded by the IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991).
On this point, e.g., Devereux and Freeman (1991, p. 8) argued that the ACE
can "operate in a classical relation with the personal tax system, so that, in
administrative terms, it will function with any form of personal taxation".
We now see that, however, entrepreneurship is discouraged if ¿w < ¿ .
Let us nally say that, under both systems, an implementation issue may
arise because entry costs are partially unobservable. Like comprehensive
income taxation, information asymmetry may arise, and therefore, cause a
distortion in entry decisions.
4 Entry and the option to quit
We next analyze the impact of taxation on entrepreneurship when individuals
can decide not only whether and when to enter the business sector but also
whether and when to quit their entrepreneurial activities and re-enter the
labor market.27 This means that an entrepreneur owns an (American) real
put option, that enables him to quit the business activity whenever he likes.
We therefore analyze a model with multiple options of the worker. It is
expected that the depreciation allowance required for tax neutrality becomes
even more complicated than analyzed above.
Since quitting a business activity is not a free lunch, we introduce the
following:
Assumption 5 If the individual re-enters the labor market, he faces an exit
cost equal to E.
Given assumption 5, we can say that E is the before-tax strike price of
the option to quit. When the value of the underlying asset (the rm value)
27Since the individual faced a sunk cost when he entered the business sector, this implies
that the entrepreneurial choice is only partially reversible, cf. also Sureth (2002). For an
early analysis of exit decision, see Dixit and Pindyck, Ch 7. The tax e¤ects on exit have
earlier been analyzed by Panteghini (2006), Agliardi and Agliardi (2009), Niemann and
Sureth (2009) and Schneider and Sureth (2010). At exit, there might be a positive book
value of the rm relative to the cost of investment and room for capital gains taxation.
We abstract from this rather complicated problem.
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is low enough, the entrepreneur nds it optimal to exercise such an option
by paying the strike price. In doing so, he re-enters the labor market. For
simplicity, we assume that re-entering the labor market is an irreversible
choice.28
Exit costs are at least partially unobservable. Indeed, the parameter E
may account for on-the-job-search costs under unemployment.29 It is realis-
tic to think that the higher the unemployment rate is the greater also the
parameter E is, and therefore the more costly it is to re-enter the labor mar-
ket.30 Hence, assumption 5 allows us to deal with labor market exibility, in
that the greater the cost E, the less exible the labor market is. As we will
see, the e¤ects of taxation may crucially depend on the characteristics of the
labor market.
Exit costs also account for the liquidation procedures which are time-
consuming, costly, and may vary from one case to another.31 Moreover, we
must consider that our entrepreneur had already abandoned the labor market
to undertake his business venture. Therefore, he may have lost employment
protection as well as job benets. In particular, the health benets nanced
by the employer are lost when the worker leaves. The loss of the benets
results in an exit cost which works against entrepreneurship. There may be
other exit costs like the need to move to another location, the loss of co-
workers as friends etc. As will be shown however, the option to quit increases
enterprise formation in the rst place.
Given assumption 4, we rst calculate the workers post-exit value func-
tion as a perpetual rent, related to the wage rate w net of exit cost E, i.e.,32
W =
w
r
¡ E: (18)
28Of course, the model could be extended by assuming that an ex-entrepreneur could
re-start a business activity and so on. This assumption would not alter the quality of our
results.
29These costs may dramatically di¤er from an individual to another (see Card et al.
(2007)).
30This is in line with Bruce (2002) who found that unemployment discourages the exit
decision.
31For a cross-country analysis of exit costs see World Banks (2011) Doing Business
2012.
32Since, by assumption, re-entering the labor market is an irreversible choice, the worker
no longer has options, and therefore, W is measured by a perpetual rent.
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4.1 Comprehensive income taxation
Let us dene Á as the percentage of deductible exit costs. This means that the
after-tax strike price is (1¡ Á¿w)E.33 Given this assumption, the workers
post-exit value function under income taxation is
W =
(1¡ ¿w)w
(1¡ ¿ ) r ¡ (1¡ Á¿w)E: (19)
As can be seen, (19) is given by a perpetual rent because, after re-entering
the labor sector, an individual owns no option to change his status.
Given (19) we prove the following:
Proposition 3 Three conditions are required for the entrepreneurial choices
to be una¤ected by income taxation: i) ¿w = ¿ , ii) Á = 0, and iii) the scal
depreciation allowance coincides with economic depreciation.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Proposition 3 represents a generalization of Proposition 1. As can be
seen, no deduction is needed for the exit costs. It is su¢cient to set ¿w = ¿
for the exit decision being una¤ected by taxation. Given Propositions 1 and
3 we can say that implementation problems regarding income taxation are
completely due to the impossibility of appropriately measuring the value of
a workers entry option. On the other hand, the tax treatment of the exit
choice does not cause any implementation problem per se.
4.2 Cash-ow and ACE taxation
Under cash-ow and ACE taxation, a workers value function takes the fol-
lowing form:
Oj(¦) =
(1¡ ¿w)w
r
+Bj1¦
¯1 with j = CF;ACE: (20)
Notice that the value of the call option to start, Bj1¦
¯1; di¤ers from the term
Aj1¦
¯1 of function (12), in that the former accounts for the higher degree of
exibility, due to the ownership of a (put) option to quit.34
33Notice that we are focusing on an ex entrepreneur who has re-entered the labor market.
The relevant tax rate is therefore ¿w.
34In other words, when an entrepreneur can quit his business activity, the exercise of
the start-up option allows him to acquire an option to quit.
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Since the entrepreneur can now decide to close his business activity and
re-enter the labor market, the value function is
V j(¦) =
(
(1¡¿)¦
r¡® +H
CF
2 ¦
¯2 under CF;
(1¡¿)¦
r¡® +
½
r ¿I +H
ACE
2 ¦
¯2 under ACE:
(21)
If we compare (21) with (14), we have now the additional term H j2¦
¯2. It
measures the value of the individual (put) option to quit and to re-enter the
labor market. In Section 3 we applied the boundary condition V j(0) = 0
(that implied Hj2 = 0), i.e., we assumed that the entrepreneur owned no
(put) option to quit. Now instead, an individual will nd it optimal to quit
even when V j(¦) > 0. Since the condition V j(0) = 0 no longer holds, we
obtain HT2 6= 0.
Following the same procedure, let us write the workers value function
after his exit from the business sector as:
W (¦) =
(1¡ ¿w)w
r
¡ (1¡ Á¿w)E: (22)
Given (12), (21) and (22) we can now analyze an individuals decisions.
Solutions are found backwards: we will rst nd the optimal exit point e¦j
and then calculate the entry trigger point ¦¤¤;j, for j = CF;ACE. As shown
in Appendix G, we obtain
Hj2 = ¡
1
¯2
(1¡ ¿)
r ¡ ®
³e¦j´1¡¯2 > 0; (23)
and
e¦j = ( ¯2¯2¡1 (r ¡ ®) ¡1¡¿w1¡¿ wr ¡ 1¡Á¿w1¡¿ E¢ under CF;¯2
¯2¡1 (r ¡ ®)
³
(1¡¿w)
(1¡¿ )
w
r ¡ ½r ¿I ¡ 1¡Á¿w1¡¿ E
´
under ACE:
(24)
Given Hj2 > 0, we can calculate the value of entrepreneurs option to exit
Hj2¦
¯2 . As can be seen, the trigger point e¦j is positively a¤ected by the
labor wage rate: i.e., the higher the wage, the higher the propensity to quit
is. It is worth noting that e¦CF > e¦ACE. Under the ACE tax, indeed, the
exit threshold point is reduced by the tax benet ½r¿I: Since such a benet is
lost whenever the individual decides to quit his business activity, he will be
induced to delay the exit decision. Therefore, the higher the tax benet ¿½I
is, the lower the point e¦j is, and the lower the probability of the exit will be.
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To analyze the other e¤ects of taxation, we use (24) and set ¿w = ¿ = 0,
thereby obtaining the zero-tax-rate trigger point:
e¦LF = ¯2¯2 ¡ 1 (r ¡ ®)
³w
r
¡ E
´
: (25)
Comparing (24) with (25) we can say that:
Proposition 4 Under the cash-ow tax, the exit decision is una¤ected by
taxation, i.e., e¦CF = e¦LF if ¿w = ¿ ; and Á = 1: Under the ACE tax, even
when ½ = r, ¿w = ¿ and Á = 1, the inequality e¦ACE < e¦LF holds.
According to Proposition 4, a uniform cash-ow tax is no longer neutral in
terms of exit decisions, unless the exit costs are fully deductible. As we have
pointed out, however, exit costs are at least partially unobservable. Given
such an information problem, the implementation of a neutral cash-ow tax
is de facto impossible.
Under the ACE taxation, the conditions of Proposition 4 are thus not
su¢cient for neutrality. Comparing (24) with (25), we immediately see thate¦ACE = e¦LF only if a rebate R = ½r ¿I is granted. In particular, if we set
½ = r, the neutral rebate is R = ¿I, which coincides with the cash-ow
tax benet ensured by an immediate write-o¤ of the initial investment I .35
Otherwise, the entrepreneur is induced to delay his exit.
Let us next analyze the optimal entry decision. As shown in Appendix
H, the trigger point is equal to
¦¤¤;j =
8>><>>:
¯1
¯1¡1 (r ¡ ®)
·
1¡¿w
1¡¿
w
r + I +
³
1¡ ¯2¯1
´
1
¯2
1
r¡®
e¦CF ³ e¦CF
¦¤¤;CF
´¡¯2¸
;
¯1
¯1¡1 (r ¡ ®)
·
1¡¿w
1¡¿
w
r +
1¡ ½r ¿
1¡¿ I +
³
1¡ ¯2¯1
´
1
¯2
1
r¡®
e¦ACE ³ e¦ACE
¦¤¤;ACE
´¡¯2¸
:
(26)
Moreover, we have
Bj1 =
(¦¤¤;j)1¡¯1
¯1
·
(1¡ ¿ )
r ¡ ® + ¯2H
j
2
¡
¦¤¤;j
¢¯2¡1¸ : (27)
35Notice that a distortion may also arise if losses are carried forward at the risk-free rate,
but future positive revenues are not su¢cient to use all tax credit (see Ball and Bowers
(1983)).
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Despite the fact that (26) is not a closed-form solution, we can compare ¦¤¤;j
with ¦¤;j. Since it holdsµ
1¡ ¯2
¯1
¶
1
¯2
1
r ¡ ®
e¦j Ã e¦j
¦¤¤;j
!¡¯2
< 0;
the comparison of (15) and (16) with (26) allows us to conclude that ¦¤;j >
¦¤¤;j: This means that the exit option, that depends on the labor market
characteristics, interacts with entry decisions. The intuition behind this re-
sult is this: the option to exit ensures some degree of business exibility.
Given partial reversibility, therefore, the cost of undertaking the business
activity is lower. This reduces the optimal entry threshold.
The e¤ect of partial reversibility on entry decisions can also be seen by
comparing (17) with (27). Given inequality¦¤;j > ¦¤¤;j , we have (¦¤;j)1¡¯1 <
(¦¤¤;j)1¡¯1 . Moreover the term ¯2H
j
2 (¦
¤¤;j)¯2¡1 is negative. It is therefore
easy to state that Bj1 < A
j
1. In other words, the existence of the option to
quit makes the individuals option to start partially reversible. This explains
why the option is exercised earlier, i.e., ¦¤;j > ¦¤¤;j .
Given (26), we can show that:
Proposition 5 The entry decision is una¤ected by the cash-ow and ACE
taxation only if exit is undistorted.
As shown in (26), an entry decision indeed is a¤ected by the exit option.
According to Proposition 5, therefore, full neutrality is ensured only if quite
restrictive conditions hold. In particular, the full deduction of exit costs
is necessary. As we have pointed out, however, it is almost impossible to
measure in practise all these costs. Due to informational problems, a neutral
cash-ow or ACE tax is de facto not implementable.
5 Concluding remarks
The paper has shown that many investment neutral tax systems, if not the
most, are not start-up neutral. Our paper has thus highlighted the argu-
ment that the idea of income tax neutrality is more often an illusion than
reality. Many well-known neutral systems of taxing income from existing
corporations typically distort the economic decisions both at the start-up
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and at the liquidation stage. These results carry a frustrating message for
tax economists not to mention policy-makers. In particular, taxation is more
distortive when entry and exit costs are substantial. Similarly, less friction
in the labor market may make taxation less distortive. The tax e¤ects thus
tend to depend on market conditions. In our view, the trouble with previous
tax analyses has been that they have been based on overly simplied mod-
els focusing on long-term equilibria. Enterprises, however, typically have a
life-cycle. No enterprise can start as a mature company. Each enterprise has
its beginning and may have a death. Furthermore, given the substantial het-
erogeneity of (observable) entry and exit costs among countries (see World
Bank (2011)), we can say that the implementation of a given tax system may
have an impact that dramatically di¤ers from one country to another.
A The derivation of (6)
Expanding (4), applying Itôs Lemma, and rearranging gives the following
non-arbitrage condition:
rO(¦) = w + ®¦O¦ +
¾2
2
¦2O¦¦: (28)
As shown in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), equation (28) has the following general
closed-form solution
O(¦) = A0 +
2X
j=1
Aj¦¯j ; (29)
with A0 = wr and the quadratic equation ª
¡
¯j
¢ ´ ¾2
2
¯j(¯j¡1)+®¯j¡r = 0;
with j = 1; 2; that has the following roots:
¯1 =
1
2
¡ ®¾2 +
q¡
®
¾2 ¡ 12
¢2
+ 2r¾2 > 1;
¯2 =
1
2
¡ ®¾2 ¡
q¡
®
¾2 ¡ 12
¢2
+ 2r¾2 < 0:
Given the boundary condition O(0) = 0; we have A2 = 0: The workers value
function (29) thus reduces to
O(¦) =
w
r
+A1¦
¯1 : (30)
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We next expand the RHS of (5), apply Itôs Lemma, and rearrange to
obtain:
rV (¦) = ¦+ ®¦V¦ +
¾2
2
¦2V¦¦:
Its general solution is
V (¦) =
¦
r
+
2X
j=1
Hj¦¯j ; with j = 1; 2: (31)
Let us next calculate Hj for j = 1; 2. Given condition V (0) = 0, we have
H2 = 0. As explained by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the term H1¦¯1 may
be referred to as a speculative bubble. Without bubbles, we therefore have
H1 = 0 and the entrepreneurs value function reduces to the present value of
a perpetual rent, i.e., V (¦) = ¦r :
Given these results, we can now calculate the optimal trigger point ¦¤.
Notice that when the worker enters the business activity he receives a net
payo¤ equal to V (¦¤) ¡ I. This means that the present value of the entre-
preneurial project, net of both the investment cost I and the option value,
is nil, i.e.,
V (¦¤)¡ I ¡O(¦¤) = 0: (32)
Substituting (30) into Eq. (32), and solving for A1 we obtain
A1 =
h
V (¦¤)¡
³w
r
+ I
´i
¦¤
¡¯1 :
Substituting this result into (30) gives (6), where ¦¤ is calculated by maxi-
mizing the start-up option, i.e., by solving the problem:
max
¦¤
"µ
¦
¦¤
¶¯1 h
V (¦¤)¡ I ¡ w
r
i#
:
B Proof of Proposition 1
Given the before-entry depreciation allowance ±O, a workers tax base is equal
to36
B = w ¡ ±O: (33)
36The depreciation or appreciation refers to a workers productivity or skill as an entre-
preneur.
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Using (33) and applying dynamic programming, we can write the workers
value function as:
OJS(¦) = [(1¡ ¿w)w + ¿w±O]wdt+ e¡(1¡¿)rdt»
£
OJS(¦ + d¦)
¤
: (34)
Expanding the RHS of (34), applying Itôs Lemma and rearranging gives:
OJS(¦) = [(1¡ ¿w)w + ¿w±O] dt
+ [1¡ (1¡ ¿ ) rdt] £OJS(¦) + dOJS (¦)¤+ o(dt); (35)
where o(dt) is the summation of all terms that go to zero faster than dt; and
dOJS (¦) =
·
®¦OJS¦ +
¾2
2
¦2OJS¦¦
¸
dt; (36)
with OJS¦ =
@OJS(¦)
@¦ , and O
JS
¦¦ =
@2OJS(¦)
@¦2 : Substituting (36) into (35) gives
OJS(¦) = [(1¡ ¿w)w + ¿w±O] dt+ (1¡ (1¡ ¿ ) rdt)OJS(¦)
+
h
®¦OJS¦ +
¾2
2
¦2OJS¦¦
i
dt:
(37)
Following Samuelson (1964) and using (7) we have
±Odt = ¡»
£
dOJS (¦)
¤
= ¡
·
®¦OJS¦ +
¾2
2
¦2OJS¦¦
¸
dt:
Using (36) and rearranging (37) gives
(1¡ ¿ ) rOJS(¦) = (1¡ ¿w)w + (1¡ ¿w)
·
®¦OJS¦ +
¾2
2
¦2OJS¦¦
¸
: (38)
If ¿ = ¿w, the non-arbitrage condition (38) reduces to
rOJS(¦) = w + ®¦OJS¦ +
¾2
2
¦2OJS¦¦: (39)
Let us next turn to the rms value function. Under a comprehensive
income tax system, the rms tax base is equal to
¦JS = ¦¡ ±V : (40)
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Using (40), we can write the rms project value as:
V JS(¦) = [(1¡ ¿ )¦ + ¿±V ]dt+ e¡(1¡¿ )rdt»
£
V JS(¦ + d¦)
¤
: (41)
Expanding the RHS of (41) and applying Itôs Lemma gives the following
di¤erential equation
V JS(¦) = [(1¡ ¿ )¦ + ¿±V ] dt+ [1¡ (1¡ ¿) r] dtV JS(¦)
+
h
®¦V JS¦ +
¾2
2
¦2V JS¦¦
i
dt+ o(dt);
(42)
where V JS¦ =
@V JS(¦)
@¦ , V
JS
¦¦ =
@2V JS(¦)
@¦2 . Using (8) we have ±V dt = ¡»
£
dV JS (¦)
¤
=h
®¦V JS¦ +
¾2
2
¦2V JS¦¦
i
dt: Rearranging (42) gives
rV JS(¦) = ¦+ ®¦V JS¦ +
¾2
2
¦2V JS¦¦ : (43)
Using (39) and (43), we can show that the non-arbitrage condition of the
entrepreneurial project, net of the option, i.e.,
r
£
V JS(¦)¡OJS(¦)¤ = (¦¡ w) + ®¦ ¡V JS¦ ¡OJS¦ ¢+ ¾22 ¦2 ¡V JS¦¦ ¡OJS¦¦¢ ;
is una¤ected by taxation. This means that the entrepreneurial decision is
undistorted by a uniform-rate comprehensive income tax.
C The calculation of (12)
Let us expand the RHS of (11) and apply Itôs Lemma. Following the same
procedure as Appendix B gives
rOj(¦) = (1¡ ¿w)w + ®¦Oj¦ +
¾2
2
¦2Oj¦¦: (44)
with Oj¦ =
@Oj (¦)
@¦ and O
j
¦¦ =
@2Oj (¦)
@¦2 : Equation (44) has the following general
closed-form solution
Oj(¦) = A0 +
2X
i=1
Aji¦
¯i: (45)
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Substituting (45) into (44) and solving gives A0 =
(1¡¿w)w
r , and the roots
¯1 > 1 and ¯2 < 0.
Let us next calculate Aj2. Notice that when ¦ goes to zero it will remain
zero in the case of a geometric Brownian motion.37 This means that ¦ = 0
is an absorbing barrier, and therefore, the workers value function reduces to
Oj(0) =
(1¡ ¿w)w
r
: (46)
Notice that, given ¯2 < 0; if ab absurdo A
j
2 6= 0, we would have lim¦!0Aj2¦¯2 =
1; and the condition (46) would fail to hold. This implies that we must set
A2 = 0: Equation (12) is thus obtained.
D The calculation of (14)
Let us expand the RHS of (13). Applying Itôs Lemma and rearranging gives
rV j(¦) = ¦j + ®¦V j¦ +
¾2
2
¦2V j¦¦: (47)
where V j¦ =
@V j (¦)
@¦ and V
j
¦¦ =
@2V j(¦)
@¦2 . The solution of (47) has the following
structure:
V j(¦) =
8>>>><>>>:
(1¡¿ )¦
r¡® +
2X
j=1
HCFi ¦
¯i under CF;
(1¡¿ )¦
r¡® +
½
r ¿I +
2X
j=1
HACEi ¦
¯i under ACE;
Let us next calculate Hji for i = 1; 2. As regards H
j
2 ; we know that ¦ = 0
is an absorbing barrier and that the condition V j(0) = 0 holds. This implies
that Hj2 = 0: Moreover, in the absence of bubbles, we have H
j
1 = 0. We have
thus obtained (14).
E Optimal entry timing
To nd the optimal trigger point above which entry is protable (¦¤;j) we
apply the Value Matching Condition (VMC) and the Smooth Pasting Con-
dition (SPC). The VMC requires at point ¦ = ¦¤;j the equality between the
37Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Ch. 5) provide further details on this point.
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present value of the project, net of the investment cost, and the value of the
option to delay investment, namely:
V j(¦¤;j)¡ I = Oj(¦¤;j) with j = CF;ACE: (48)
The VMC (48) implies that when the option is exercised optimally (i.e., at
point ¦ = ¦¤;j) the entrepreneur receives a net payo¤ equal to V (¦¤;j) ¡ I.
The SPC requires the equality between the slopes of [V j(¦)¡ I ] and Oj(¦)
at point ¦ = ¦¤;j, i.e.,
@ [V j(¦)¡ I ]
@¦
¯¯¯¯
¦=¦¤;j
=
@Oj(¦)
@¦
¯¯¯¯
¦=¦¤;j
: (49)
The SPC (49) equates the marginal benet of entrepreneurship (on the LHS)
and the marginal cost of exercising the option (on the RHS), that is the
marginal cost of losing business exibility. Substituting (12) and (14) into
(48) and (49), and solving gives (15) and (16).
F Proof of Proposition 3
As shown by Proposition 1, entry neutrality holds only when ¿w = ¿ and
when the economic depreciation of the workers option to become an entre-
preneur is deductible. To prove exit neutrality, it is thus su¢cient to show
that the same rule holds for the after-exit value function.
Under an income tax, the after-exit net present value is equal to
W JS(¦) =
(1¡ ¿w)w
(1¡ ¿) r ¡ (1¡ Á¿w)E: (50)
By setting ¿ = ¿w and Á = 0; (50) collapses to (18). Given this result and
Proposition 1, we can thus say that the joint application of a uniform taxation
and economic depreciation ensures tax-rate invariance. This concludes the
proof of Proposition 3.¥
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G Optimal exit timing under consumption-
based taxation
To nd the optimal exit point, we substitute (21) and (22) into (48) and (49).
Under cash-ow taxation we have
(1¡ ¿) e¦CF
r ¡ ® +H
CF
2
³e¦CF´¯2 = (1¡ ¿w)w
r
¡ (1¡ Á¿w)E; (51)
and
(1¡ ¿)
r ¡ ® + ¯2H
CF
2
³e¦CF´¯2¡1 = 0: (52)
Under ACE taxation, we have the following two-equation system:
(1¡ ¿ ) e¦ACE
r ¡ ® +
½
r
¿I +HACE2
³e¦ACE´¯2 = (1¡ ¿w)w
r
¡ (1¡ Á¿w)E; (53)
(1¡ ¿)
r ¡ ® + ¯2H
ACE
2
³e¦ACE´¯2¡1 = 0: (54)
Solving the systems (51)-(52), and (53)-(54) for Hj2 and e¦j, with j = CF;ACE,
gives (23) and (24), respectively.
H Optimal start-up timing with the option
to quit
The optimal start-up timing is obtained by substituting (20) and (21) into
(48) and (49). Under the cash-ow taxation, we have:
(1¡ ¿ )¦¤¤;CF
r ¡ ® +H
CF
2 ¦
¤¤;CF¯2 ¡ I = (1¡ ¿w)w
r
+BCF1 ¦
¤¤;CF¯1 ; (55)
and
(1¡ ¿)
r ¡ ® + ¯2H
CF
2 ¦
¤¤;CF¯2¡1 = ¯1B
CF
1 ¦
¤¤;CF¯1¡1 : (56)
Similarly, under the ACE taxation, we have
(1¡ ¿ )¦¤¤;ACE
r ¡ ® +
½
r
¿I+HACE2 ¦
¤¤;ACE¯2 ¡I = (1¡ ¿w)w
r
+BACE1 ¦
¤¤;ACE¯1 ;
(57)
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(1¡ ¿)
r ¡ ® + ¯2H
ACE
2 ¦
¤¤;ACE¯2¡1 = ¯1B
ACE
1 ¦
¤¤;ACE¯1¡1 : (58)
Next solve (55) and (56) for ¦¤¤;CF and BCF1 . Similarly, solve (57) and (58)
for ¦¤¤;ACE and BACE1 . We thus obtain (26) and (27).
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